In contrast to the European Commission's Capital Market Action Plan, this paper takes the view that national limitations on crowd investing and crowd lending de facto are the result of limits de iure. Given that no European passport is tailor made or fits crowdfunding, this source of financing is doomed to remain national. Moreover, with different legal requirements in Member States, European law hinders the development of cross-border crowdfunding within the region. This is particularly true for smaller Member States whose populations are too small to constitute 'a crowd'. This paper details how European regulators could facilitate a Single European Crowdfunding Market while limiting both the risks for investors and the regulatory burden for crowdfunding platforms and recipients. In light of the regulatory experience with other financial products and the segregating effect of product-based approaches, many of which exist in the EU/EEA Member States, we believe existing product regulation is insufficient to enable a European cross-border crowdfunding market. Instead, regulation based on the 'MiFID light' framework could function as basis for a cross-border Introduction
Crowdfunding -an outcome of the modern sharing economy 1 -has experienced rapid growth in some EU Member States, notably the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 2 However, home bias by investors and regulatory barriers including different approaches by several Member States prevent crowd-funded projects and 'the crowd' from moving freely across borders. In turn, crowdfunding has remained a mainly national issue. 3 For the most part, crowdfunding has remained a phenomenon of the larger Member States that can 'draw a crowd', specifically those with a large enough population to make a crowdfunding venture an economically feasible undertaking. There is a valid concern that cross-border crowdfunding -already being low in volume 4 -is going to 1 decline even further, in line with increased national legislation being put into place. Regulatory attention has thus shifted from initial curiosity to ensuring 'that crowdfunding can be done seamlessly across borders.' 5 We support that view. Drawing on the experience of other financial products, such as the early days of Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), we take the view that Crowdfunding ('CF') can only reach its full potential if national regulatory regimes within the EU and EEA do not inhibit the use of crowdfunding platforms.
This paper focuses on commercial approaches to crowdfunding as investment, reward or peer-to-peer lending schemes. Other forms include donation-based crowdfunding, where people donate for a specific charitable project, rewards-based models, where investors provide funding in form of a donation and expect to receive non-financial rewards or goods in exchange.
the EC's Capital Market Union action plan 9 and reviews the steps that are necessary to develop a true cross-border market for crowdfunding in Europe. A true cross-border crowdfunding market has two dimensions: projects in one Member State may be funded via platforms located in different Member States, and investors will also examine platforms and projects in other Member States. If this occurs, risk for funding innovative businesses may be spread across Europe while potential demand may be maximized.
The paper is structured as follows: Part two will summarise the discussion to date and will highlight the importance of crossborder crowdfunding, unlocking its potential to close the seed funding gap for European enterprises. Part three outlines options for regulation implementation, regulation of the product, sales and distribution, and manager regulation. We argue that manager regulation is most suited to facilitating a Crowdfunding Capital Markets Union as it retains an open approach to innovation while mitigating the agency risks imposed on investors and funded enterprises when using a crowdfunding platform. Taking into account that European financial law underwent a significant expansion over the last ten years, part four proposes a panEuropean crowdfunding regime based on Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) CRR, an often overlooked exemption for small financial intermediaries based on the MiFID framework. With small modifications, a European passport based on the 'MiFiD light' rules referred to in Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) CRR could close the circle (or more precisely: the triangle) in furthering a single European capital market, protecting investors and keeping down costs for intermediaries, funded firms and investors.
II.
Regulating crowdfunding
The market for crowdfunding across Europe is fragmented and diverse and includes more than 500 platforms. The crowd may donate, invest, lend or buy, or they may expect non-financial rewards. 10 The common denominator in the investment, reward or peer-to-peer lending schemes that this paper focuses on is the participation of a large number of funders who grant modest individual contributions gathered via the internet and who expect 9 European Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, at 7, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015) . The CMU action plan builds on the Commission's previous work, in particular European Commission, Consultation Document: Crowdfunding in the EU-Exploring the Added Value of Potential EU Action (Oct. 3, 2013) , available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/consultati on-document_en.pdf (last visited Oct.11, 2016) leading to the EC, Communication: Unleashing the Potential of Crowdfunding in the European Union, COM (2014) 172 final (March 27, 2014) . a return on their investment.
11 A platform that, as a minimum, provides the online infrastructure and some basic information on the activities to be funded, mediates between the project and the crowd. Although a platform is not necessary for collecting capital via crowdfunding, its use is common.
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The concept is driven by the idea of collective intelligence. 13 Crowdfunding promises to democratise financing processes and create a level playing field for competing ideas. The judgement of the 'swarm' is deemed to be as wise as that of professional asset managers, investors or creditors. While collecting funds from a large number of people is not innovative per se -we find the same approach has been used by honest entrepreneurs, fraudsters and creators of Ponzi schemes for hundreds of years 14 -, the innovative aspect of crowdfunding is the use of the internet, essentially social media, as a marketing and communication tool.
In this section, we argue that crowdfunding creates certain benefits. These benefits, however, do not justify an exemption from financial law altogether given that all established objectives of European financial law 15 apply: investor protection, systemic risk prevention, stakeholder protection and facilitation of a single European market for financial services.
Benefits of crowdfunding
Europe is in desperate need of growth, and SMEs are at the core of economic growth and employment. Although SME access to finance has improved significantly, it remains one of the most pressing challenges in furthering economic growth and innovation.
16 Between 54%-75% of external SME finance is sourced from bank loans, while market-based finance is underrepresented. 17 Market-based finance finds itself in the midst of the EU Plans for establishing a European Capital Markets Union.
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Crowdfunding's focus is on financing of SMEs and emerging Start-ups. Financing of innovative ideas is difficult. Bank financing is barely accessible due to high information asymmetries and typically a lack of collateral.
19 Financing by angel investors or seed venture capital financing is scarce. Venture capitalists turn down as much as 99% of the projects proposed to them. 20 Often the entrepreneur's family and friends step in. Rather than the quality of the business concept, successful seed financing often depends on geography, networks or gender. 21 Crowdfunding, in particular peer-to-peer lending and equity funding, effectively channels funds from households to those parts of the economy that are not served by traditional financiers, providing funding for projects that may otherwise not be financed. 22 Compared to other forms of market-based finance, crowdfunding creates new investment opportunities while at the same time spreading the risk among a target group of investors that may otherwise have been reluctant to invest. The bridging of these financing gaps is in the interest of the overall economy. Given that small-and medium-sized enterprises provide the majority of jobs and innovation, crowdfunding may foster growth in the European economy.
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Crowdfunding subjects the business concept to a 'crowd test'. An entrepreneur needs to 'sell' their idea to a crowd of financiers. Certain intuitive ideas that may be hard to sell to professional investors may find support from the crowd. This is particularly true for consumer-related projects with a strong emotional appeal, or for those whose appeal is limited to particular peer groups.
From an investor's point of view, crowdfunding may serve as a new tool for diversification. If the administration costs of a virtual platform are lower than those of traditional forms of financing, crowdfunding may also reduce the financing costs of the borrower. If the crowdfunding investor is shareholder in the crowdfunded entity, they may receive increased investment returns. Further, higher competition among crowdfunding providers may unlock innovation and lower costs, and may also promote increased efficiency among traditional finance providers.
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With regard to new business, we note a divide between private and public returns: Most start-ups fail, leaving seed financiers out of pocket. However, even businesses that fail provide some benefit to society, through the knowledge generated, jobs created and social security levies paid for a certain period of time.
Regulators around the world thus seek to promote the establishment of new businesses.
Objectives of financial law
The imposition of financial law, in general, is justified by investor protection, market function and stakeholder concerns. RES. 6, 1919 RES. 6, , 1923 RES. 6, (2014 However, a closer look reveals the crowd to be a false friend. Insights from behavioural finance contradict the notion of the crowd's wisdom: Crowds may act irrationally, exhibiting 'lemming-like' behaviour 42 . Evidence from existing platforms indicates the incidence of herding. 43 Specifically, investors are found to be overoptimistic. 44 The quality of social media information is also uncertain, as its impact value can be watered down by biased comments, and its distribution is for the most part erratic. The same is true for comments and discussion as innovative features of a crowdfunding platform. Investors seem to be influenced by supposed fellow investors, who comment positively on the platform. 45 Investors usually do not leave their homes to invest and tend to receive no advice prior to investment. It is doubtful that this crowd of 'couchfunders' is able to undertake the neutral processing and valuation of information that a diligent credit or investment decision requires. 50 For the most part, funders lack basic experience with venture capital financing and the funded technologies.
51 Even with neutral information in their hands, few will be able to draw correct conclusions. Even if they are, lockin effects could force them to readjust their preferences. Some of these effects may be instilled by the crowd (or some of its members). Investors finding themselves locked into an unviable investment may try to maintain its value by talking it up on social media so that other crowdfunders inject further funds at unjustified pricing levels.
With regard to the traditional distribution of financial instruments, the phenomenon of talking up investments is well known within, and is addressed by, financial law. For instance, for publicly traded assets, Article 14 and Annex I Market Abuse Regulation 2014/596/EU prohibit market manipulation by virtue of inadequate information being distributed to the public. Conflict of interest rules imposed by the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) and the Directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITD) prevent asset and fund managers from talking up, front running, and dumping assets into funds they 47 Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 68; Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22 at 1789. 48 See also ESMA, supra note 3, at 11; discussing the potential civil law consequences; see Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22 at 1792 et seq. 49 Heminway, supra note 8, at 832; Hazen, supra note 8, at 1766; also Fink, supra note 8, at 8, 31 (finding that crowdfunders stem from various social groups, are very heterogeneous and not necessarily acquainted to the world of venture capital and risky investments).
50 Sceptical also Tomboc, supra note 7, at 268; Hazen, supra note 8, at 1737; Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22 at 1789. 51 Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 574 et seq. manage 52 -an action which is similar to the fund platform selling unsuccessful business models to the crowd. If crowdfunding is out of scope of financial law, potential funders are left vulnerable.
In short, the 'wisdom of the crowd' proposition is similar to libertarian theory, which holds that markets are most effective without any regulatory intervention. From an investor protection perspective, the call for unregulated crowdfunding based on the intelligence of the crowd sounds like a proposed revival of the laissez faire approach of the 1920s. If the libertarian theory held true, we could forego all financial regulation. However, regulators have taken a different view as almost 100 years of financial regulation demonstrate.
b) Systemic risk prevention
Presently, the overall financing volume of crowdfunding platforms is low. 54 Applying the 'too-big-to-fail' (TBTF) rationale, we have little reason to regulate. Further, if primarily retail investors participate in crowdfunding, the 'too-connectedto-fail' rationale does not justify regulation of crowdfunding.
However, the institutionalisation of crowdfunding is an emerging trend. Data gathered by the European Commission indicates increasing professional investment in crowdfunded assets. 55 Over the past few years, crowdfunding has attracted a rising number of institutional investors, either as funders or as direct investors in crowdfunding platforms. 53 For example the peer-to-peer lending, where crowdfunding provides only 0,02 % of the bank originated credit, see Kirby & Worner, supra note 22, at 33. 54 We only state here that the rationale of financial law applies. This does not exclude that some rules are superfluous or too burdensome, but this is a question of which financial law applies to which conduct.
55 See European Commission, Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, supra note 2, at 13 ("A growing trend that is expected to become more prominent in the future is the institutionalisation of crowdfunding, notably in terms of the investors. This trend is supported by a recent study which found that 45% of platforms in the United Kingdom reported institutional involvement, compared to 28% in 2014 and just 11% in 2013. Institutional involvement is particularly strong in consumer loans crowdfunding, while in equity-based crowdfunding a growing number of venture capital and angel investors are co-investing alongside or in parallel with 'crowd investors'. The 'institutional investor' category is quite broad and includes banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, asset management companies, but also local authorities and national development banks.").
56 See Report of Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance in partnership with KPMG and CME Group Foundation on Sustaining Momentum, The 2 nd European Alternative Finance Industry Report, at 20 and 41 (September 2016) available at assumption of transparency, these investors may be able to protect themselves. However, the more active professional investors become in this market, the more the TCTF rationale justifies regulation.
In addition, given the current growth rate of crowdfunding 57 the TBTF objective may justify regulation in the near future.
Finally, crowdfunding platforms compete with heavily regulated intermediaries. Regulation imposes costs. Intermediaries without regulation can grow faster than regulated ones, as they have a larger share of their returns available for growth rather for maintenance of their businesses. At the same time, the level of protection provided to retail funders is low. All in all, the position of regulated 'well-governed' intermediaries and their regulators is weakened as business is shifted to unregulated entities. 58 Even worse, without any regulation in place, regulators are unable to observe transaction volumes and the trading conduct of crowdfunding platforms.
59 Money laundering https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/nl/pdf/2016/sector/financialservices/sustaining-momentum-the-2nd-european-alternative-financeindustry-report.pdf ("Institutionalisation took off in mainland Europe in 2015 with 26% of peer-to-peer consumer lending and 24% of peer-to-peer business lending funded by institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds, asset management firms and banks. 8% of the investment in equity-based crowdfunding was also funded by institutional investors such as venture capital firms, angels, family offices or funds. Excluding the UK, 44% of the surveyed European platforms reported some level of institutional funding in 2015 and just under 30% of peer-to-peer consumer lending platforms reported having a majority institutional shareholder (e.g. a VC, corporate or a bank)"). may also be a concern, 60 as crowdfunding could well be a form of 'shadow funding.'
c) Stakeholder protection
In European financial law, stakeholder concerns relating to the protection of SMEs have been used as a justification for regulation. 61 These concerns apply to crowdfunding as well. For instance, several target companies have had to share their intellectual property with a platform provider as a pre-condition for funding, or have had to enter into onerous contracts that potentially hamper the SME's future growth. 62 Upon the platform provider's insolvency, entrepreneurs could find themselves in a difficult position if the platform has diverted investors' funds 63 or if the start-up is otherwise entangled in the platform's insolvency. Disentangling the relationship between an insolvent platform and an SME may be costlier than the SME may be able to afford. An SME's dependency on a platform may also be a reason for concern. In essence, the platform functions as the SME's sole investment bank. The platform provider may impose its own feedriven interests upon the firm. For instance, it could press the SME to acquire another firm funded by the platform, or forego business opportunities taken up by other platform-funded firms, or make additional funding dependent on egregious fees. Again, all of this is not new. Financial law deals with these issues in various ways, including takeover, fair dealing and conflict of interest rules. Conflict of interest rules require intermediaries to avoid conflicts in the first place, or to manage conflicting interests with regard to the interests of all parties concerned. While some regulators have imposed mandatory rules on crowdfunding platforms 64 
Promoting a Single Market for crowdfunding
The European Union was established as an economic union under the premise of a free, borderless, single market. The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (one pillar of the EU's 'constitution') defines integration into a single market as the main goal of EU policy. 65 In contrast, although the internet is international in nature and crowdfunding platforms may be accessed from all around the world, crowdfunding platforms operate for the most part from the UK, followed by France and Germany, 66 and most of the time focus on projects located in their home country. Cross-border crowdfunding where a platform and funded project each reside in different EU/EEA Member States is rare, amounting to just 7.3% of the amount raised in 2014.
67 Cross-border equity crowdfunding is even more limited, accounting for only EUR1.8m out of a total EUR104.8m in 2014 (< 1,3%). 68 However, in a truly European crowdfunding market, not only shall the investment side of crowdfunding, but the investors as well shall be spread across borders. Due to the nature of crowdfunding as an internet phenomenon, this should be the easiest of exercises. And yet, cross-border fund raising is still hampered by additional legal 69 and tax barriers. In particular, crowdfunding takes different legal forms and is subject to different regulation in various EU/EEA member states.
Platform providers are burdened with a plethora of additional rules when crossing borders. Divergent rules on crowdfunding in member states unsurprisingly hamper rather than promote cross border activity.
70 While a lot of market participants wish to cross borders, they are being deterred by a lack of information about applicable rules and high costs of multiple authorisations emphasizes risks regarding to retail trading over investment platforms, in particular risks resulting from conflicts of interest and insufficient cost and fee transparency.
in different member states. 71 In particular for platforms from smaller countries, cross-border access is vital, both in terms of projects and funding. In order to establish a truly European capital market and strengthen alternative sources of finance for SMEs 72 , facilitation of cross-border SME financing is crucial.
The regulatory objective in facilitating a single market is different from the respective perspective of investors, the financial system and stakeholder protection. While the former justifies restrictions, the promotion of a single crowdfunding market justifies some liberation. The prevailing method of facilitating single market access in financial law is, however, the European passport. The European passporting system is built on the presumption that the passported activity is at its core a regulated activity, which means a license is necessary prior to taking up the activity in the entity's home market. The license is issued subject to several preconditions, which we discuss in the next section. However, one aspect is noteworthy. 74 ESMA, supra note 3, at 11 et seq.
• A mechanism to ensure that investors are aware of the associated risks; • Segregation of client assets in case of platform insolvency; • Rules concerning the governance of the platform, inter alia business continuity provisions and safeguards against conflict of interests; and • Clear rules, and perhaps communication requirements, regarding the platform's responsibilities and accountability to the client.
Particularly geared to the needs of the industry are the proposals of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). Regarding the exclusion of offerings less than EUR 1 million from the prospectus requirements, the ECON states that "a minimum level of consumer protection" should be granted through risk warnings and basic disclosure, "basic organisational requirements", cancellation rights and caps on the investment amount.
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Given the plethora of financial legislation since the GFC, both wish lists prompt the question of whether special legislation for crowdfunding is warranted, or whether we can deal with crowdfunding using the established tools of financial law. We find the answer in the legal diversity of crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding is a real-world phenomenon that can take on different legal forms. For instance, crowd-sourced equity platforms 76 facilitate investors acquiring stakes in small businesses with innovative business ideas. These stakes can have any legal form, ranging from simple contractual return promises of an unspecified kind, to securities, limited partnerships, debt instruments or a combination of the these. 81 and the provision of credit (CRD IV/CRR 82 ). For legal certainty, these boxes are narrowly defined. If one of the defining characteristics is missing, European financial law will not apply. For instance, the provider of a peer-to-peer-lending platform will not provide credit as this necessitates lending against the entity's balance sheet. Accordingly, the platform is not a credit institution for the purposes of European banking law. Since the platform does not pool the capital provided by lenders it is out of scope for European collective investment law. The provider of an investment platform that avoids the investment characteristics of financial instruments is out of scope of MiFID II/MiFIR, etc.
This situation gives cause for concern. Funders, either investors or lenders, typically expect a return on their investment. Hence, investor protection concerns are paramount. Moreover, the regulatory provisions are sometimes applied differently between Member States. For instance, the traditional German view deemed long established participation in limited partnerships to be out of scope of MiFID, while these arrangements were deemed financial instruments in Luxembourg reluctant to take on the costs and risks of going across the border.
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In the following section, we discuss the options available for a cross-border crowdfunding passport, following the traditional regulatory categories of product, sales and manager/ intermediary regulation.
Product regulation a) Definition
Product regulation is predicated on a tight product definition. The law prescribes the legal characteristics of the investment product which is subject to authorisation. These characteristics together make sure that the risks for investors from the financial product are mitigated to an extent that investors are willingly ready to bear. Product regulation seeks to abolish all risks other than investment risk, for which investors are compensated. In practice, product rules rarely achieve this objective.
b) Example
The UCITSD is the most successful example of product regulation. Pursuant to Art. 5 (1) UCITSD, "[n]o UCITS shall pursue activities as such unless it has been authorised in accordance with" the UCITSD. The authorisation is contingent on the fund document's compliance with the UCITS investment restrictions, transparency requirements and general obligations, the appointment of a licensed UCITS fund management company, the appointment of a licensed depository and the directors of the depository being of sufficiently good repute and experience in relation to the type of UCITS.
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The UCITS investment restrictions relate to the core of the UCITS product. The UCITS investment strategy specified in Art. 50 -57 UCITSD focuses on liquid assets due to its openended nature, i.e. investors can redeem their investment at any time during the life of the UCITS. The UCITSD seeks to achieve liquidity of the UCITS assets with an extensive list of underlying assets in Article 50 (1) UCITSD, which by their nature are deemed liquid. These underlying assets range from transferable securities issued in respect of money market funds traded on capital markets, to more exotic assets such as untraded money market instruments backed by (1) public institutions, (2) The example of the UCITSD is a strong argument that product rules may function as signal to investors, but may need to be supplemented by manager regulation. However, in the case of crowdfunding, the product is not clearly defined. Crowdfunding could refer to a donation, a debt, an investment, or a combination of each. 86 More importantly than the form of the investment, the underlying business model is far from uniform. Business ideas range from simple to sophisticated technology. The only common denominator is that investors encounter the business via internet. This is insufficient to draft product regulation for crowdfunding.
Sales / Distribution regulation a) Definition
The legal focus of sales regulation is the point of sale or distribution, i.e. contact with the client. Sales regulation can take one of two forms. Either it may seek to ensure that investors are informed in a standardised way via a prospectus or key investor document (type 1 rules, or disclosure approach), or it may seek to ensure that investors have access only to products suitable for them. In the latter case, the financial intermediary functions as a gatekeeper. Rather than offering all products to the investor, the intermediary filters the investment universe and distinguishes between suitable from unsuitable products (type 2 rules, or KYC approach). Type 1 or type 2 rules may be supplemented by type 3 rules that restrict the nominal amounts investors may invest.
b) Examples
Type 1 (disclosure): PD and PRIIPSR The PD 87 facilitates the raising of capital in a cross-border context. It does so by imposing a common standard, in return providing a single passport for cross-border offerings. Whenever securities are offered to the public or traded on a regulated market, a prospectus must be drawn up and published after being approved by the NCA. 88 Based on this approval, the securities may be offered publicly in all member states. The PD determines the content and form of the prospectus and regulates what information investors need in order to make a sound investment decision. The PD thus provides reliable minimum standards for investors, as well as legal certainty and a level-playing field for issuers.
The regulatory goal is investor protection through the provision of information, as well as protection of the proper functioning of the financial markets by maintaining investor confidence. A prospectus should enable investors to understand their rights and to assess the risks associated with a security and thus make informed decisions. 89 The issuer, guarantor or party seeking admission to trading is responsible for the information that must be specified in the prospectus.
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The PD covers all kinds of transferable securities under Art. 1 (1) and 2 (1) (a) MiFiD. It was not designed to apply in the crowdfunding context: (1) Publishing a PD-compliant prospectus drawn up for the professional trading of a security in capital markets is costly. Including drafting costs, fees of external advisers, translation, regulatory fees and auditing fees, estimates range between EUR200,000 to EUR300,000.
91 (2) The complexity of the prospectus is high and seems out of place in the social media influenced crowdfunding. Given the high costs and complexity, PD-based regulation is unattractive for crowdfunding platforms.
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Crowdfunding platforms can avoid the application of the PD by several means. First, they can tailor the investment such that is does not meet the definition of 'security'. Notably in Germany, various methods were developed to an extent that prompted the German parliament to add additional prospectus requirements for investments that do not meet the securities definition.
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Second, the obligation to publish a prospectus does not apply if the offer is sufficiently small that the drawing up of a costly prospectus is disproportionate to the proceeds of the offer. For instance, Art. 1 (1) h) exempts a PD from the prospectus requirement if the total consideration for the offer stays below EUR5m for 12 months. 94 In this case the offer is excluded from the scope of the PD. However, the EU/EEA Member States may impose additional national requirements for offers between EUR100,000 and EUR5m for 12 months. 95 Currently 17 Member States make use of that option. 96 The recast of the PD will raise the respective thresholds even further in order to create a safe harbour for crowdfunding initiatives.
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While one could question the desirability of the prospectus exemptions due to the cost-benefit ratio of the PD, we believe the non-application of the PD to be of greater importance for the viability of a well-functioning crowdfunding market: The EUR200,000 to EUR300,000 prospectus cost exceeds the average crowdfunding offer size in Europe.
98 Such a cost burden would make crowdfunding unviable. Further, significant data disclosures in a prospectus concern the past while crowdfunding 92 They try to tailor their business such as to maneuver under and around, see ESMA, supra note 3, at 9, ¶22; Klöhn, Hornuf & Schilling, supra note 2 at 61 et seq. Under the type 2 approach, the regulator seeks to ensure that investors have access only to products and information suitable for them. There are two ways to ensure suitability, either through defining suitability in a general and abstract manner and banning inexperienced investors from certain products, or through delegating the suitability test to the financial intermediary to filter the investment universe and single out suitable and unsuitable products. For example, a MIFID investment firm must conduct a client investigation (know your customer) and may only recommend or offer financial instruments that fit the specific needs and interests of the client. 101 To fulfil the KYC rules, the investment firm must obtain information about the client's financial situation, risk tolerance, knowledge and investment experience with respect to the targeted product type or service and the potential loss associated with the product. (2015) 103 that limits the amount investors may invest into crowdfunding schemes at EUR1,000 per issuer. The amount is EUR10,000 if the investors declare total fungible assets of at least EUR100,000 or do not invest more than double their monthly net income. Type 3 rules apply also in Austria, where single investors may invest up to EUR5,000 per issue in any twelve-month period, unless they declare that they are not investing more than twice their monthly net income or ten percent of their financial assets.
104 Similar rules are common elsewhere within and beyond European borders.
c) Discussion
None of the rules governing distribution are fit for crowdfunding. As to type 1 (disclosure) rules, the costs of drawing up mandatory disclosure are significant, while the willingness of 'the crowd' to read and apply the information provided to them is cast in doubt. Crowdfunding is characterized by a certain degree of irrationality, which is both a weakness and a strength. It is a weakness, since disclosure-based investor protection does not work in that many crowdfunding investors do not regard themselves as investors, but as supporters and business angels of innovation. It is a strength, as irrationality, or perhaps defiance of convention, creates new business ideas that reveal sales potential by catering to people's emotions. Third, foregoing disclosure obligations altogether does not resolve the issue of cross-border crowdfunding. This is because without a prospectus we lack the basis on which to grant a prospectus passport.
Type 2 (KYC) rules are associated with two issues: cost and expertise. Due to cost, most legislators seeking to enable lowcost crowdfunding have scaled back on KYC requirements. Type 2 rules require the platform provider to inquire into the knowledge, skills and experience of all retail individuals that together constitute 'the crowd', even though each funder invests (a) the person is a retail client in relation to the offer; and (b) having regard only to CSF offers for which the intermediary is the responsible intermediary, the application would result in the total amount paid or payable by the person in respect of applications made by the person, in any period of 12 months, pursuant to CSF offers made by the same company, exceeding: (i) $10,000 ...").
very little at one time. From a cost/benefit perspective, such a 'per client' approach is uneconomical and risks foreclosing crowdfunding altogether. Regulators who apply KYC checks in principle, provide exemptions from appropriateness and suitability tests if investors are protected by less expensive regulatory tools. 106 In Italy, which to our knowledge is the only country that has fully applied MiFID-style KYC rules to crowdfunding 107 , a reform is in the making. While costs are certain, expertise on the side of platform providers to assess the appropriateness of investors is uncertain. Using non-experts as gatekeepers makes things worse rather than better.
As to type 3 (investment limits), any strict investment limit is either too high or too low. For poor people, even small amounts are too high as these could include all their savings, while at the same time restrict the ability of wealthy individuals to support innovative enterprises 108 and diversify their portfolios. We also observe an enforcement issue. Investors can participate in multiple platforms. Limiting losses on a possibly well governed platform may have a harmful effect if the same investors participate in other less well governed platforms. In fact, a smaller investment amount per platform could reduce investor due diligence and exacerbate the collective action problems inherent in crowdfunding.
109 Finally, type 3 regulation does not 106 For instance, while in the UK FCA Policy Statement PS14/4 in theory requires an appropriateness assessment of retail clients intermediaries do not need to ensure that individuals continue to qualify under that appropriateness test on an ongoing basis. In particular, the appropriateness test does not apply where retail clients certify that they will not invest more than 10% of their net investible assets in non-readily realisable securities; further an appropriateness test of the past is valid for 12 months. None of the product and sales regulation types of regulation provide the basis for a European passport for crowdfunding platforms engaged in low-volume SME investments. There are two reasons for this. First, cross-border notification per product or per sales effort over time is more expensive than one notification per platform where the platform has multiple products to fund and where funding periods for each product are limited to several weeks or months. Second, if European regulation focuses on products, Member States could retain jurisdiction over manager regulation. There is currently a patchwork of harmonised European law in the field of financial markets. National gold plating in the case of minimum harmonisation as well as national regulation in un-harmonised areas of law could prevail. A clear-cut European legal framework is of the utmost importance.
Crowdfunding platforms are intermediaries that bring together the supply and demand of capital by providing the infrastructure necessary to present the projects, the legal framework for investment, as well as ongoing support for both supply and demand. Most crowdfunding platforms provide services to protect investors, such as screening of projects, information on applicable fees, identity checks of project owners, facilitation of communication between funders and project owners, and information to funders regarding associated risks.
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At the same time, crowdfunding platforms operate on a for-profit basis. While fee structures are not uniform, we find fees are similar to the asset management world. Crowdfunding platforms charge (1) an initial investment fee, taken prior to channelling the investment to meet demand once the overall funding amount has reached the minimum investment threshold, (2) an ongoing annual 'management' fee charged to the user of funds, and /or (3) a performance fee dependent on the user's successful growth and exit. 112 This may incentivise platforms to increase the number of potential entrepreneurs, establish trust amongst investors and limit fraudulent use of the platform. 113 On the downside, we may see excessive fees similar to those in the asset management and fund distribution chain. In the latter case, fiduciary risk has materialised. European financial law has implemented 'manager' regulation to counter the risk that intermediaries abuse their fiduciary capacity at a cost to investors.
a) Licensing requirements
Asset managers and investment advisers are subject to a general prohibition under all investment legislation, but which is lifted when the manager is authorised by the national competent authority. 114 The most important licensing requirements 115 include a fit-and-proper test for senior management; minimum capital requirements (details vary); a review of the business plan; adequate risk controls; an adequate business organisation; reliable significant shareholders; reliable third-country relationships, if any, and provision for a mandatory withdrawal of the license if the intermediary no longer meets the requirements of the applicable legislation.
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The standardisation of operating conditions has gained momentum with the European Commission's statements on the governance of financial institutions. 117 The most important are rules governing managers' operations 118 including commitments to fairness, honesty and investors' best interests; conflicts of interest; best execution; the intermediary's remuneration; the prohibition of letter-box entities or shell companies; valuations; and extensive reporting obligations to NCAs especially with regard to the use of securities financing techniques. Also covered is the NCA's power to impose leverage limits or other intervene against a product set-up.
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Modern European risk management rules are driven by developments in risk management methodology introduced via the banking sector.
120 Since cross-sectoral consistency is a stated policy goal, we deem the tripartite distinction between institutional risk management (risk organisation), operational risk management (risk procedures) and quantitative risk management (risk measurement) to be a common feature of European risk management law.
121 Similarly, the substantive rules on risk management show remarkable similarities.
122 These include the types of risks to be considered; upgrading operational risk to the same level as financial risk; measurement methodologies; risk measurement across sectors that rely on a commitment approach, VaR or company-specific models; and the imposition of risk limits.
b) Discussion
The platform provider is deemed the most efficient focal point of regulation.
123 Regulating the platform rather than products or distribution allows a certain level of proportionality in regulation whilst not sacrificing investor protection. Platform regulation does not protect investors in a paternalistic way by prohibiting them from taking on certain investment risks, but provides them with protection from risks such as fraud or negligence. Of particular importance are the rules on conflicts of interest which prevent platform providers from marketing businesses in which they hold significant stakes on a preferred basis with a view to flipping or dumping these stakes. All these details can be regulated at low cost for the product offering. ESMA voices the concern that crowdfunding platforms try to circumvent the application of MiFID by making securities nontransferable. Circumvention of MiFID not only reduces the cross-border availability of crowdfunding platforms but also, more importantly, the level of investor protection. ESMA urges regulators to "reduce the incentive" for circumvention.
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However, as long as the MiFID framework imposes significant costs that could de facto erase crowdfunding in smaller countries in particular, national regulators will refrain from imposing such legislation. They would face the risk of erecting excessively high barriers of entry to the crowdfunding market, rendering the market dysfunctional before it even started. Even if a passport for the whole of Europe looks more appealing, a new approach is of the essence.
IV. 'MiFiD light' platform regulation: policy considerations
In the preceding section, we established the need for regulation of platforms according to the 'manager' type of regulation of European financial law. At the same time, the MiFID II/MiFIR as well as the other fully regulated AIFMD, UCITSD and the CRD/CRR framework with regulation-induced fixed costs starting at EUR500,000 p.a. are too costly for crowdfunding platforms as long as the overall transaction volume per platform is low and costs per product are high. While this may change with crowdfunding growing into an established way of financing, costs and the substance of regulation today will influence whether crowdfunding can be established this waywith Italy being the most prominent example of how overly strict From the licensing conditions (supra, III.3), besides the fact that there is a licensing requirement as such, capital requirements erect the most effective barrier to business. Our understanding of platform activity as order reception, transmission and execution allows for reliance on an exemption from the CRD IV/CRR framework. Article 4(1) No. 2 (c) CRR exempts certain intermediaries from the onerous CRD IV / CRR capital requirements. These include investment firms that do not function as depositaries, do not hold client assets and that focus on order reception and transmission, order execution, portfolio management and investment advice. These CRR-exempted investment firms are subject to minimum capital requirements of EUR50,000 or EUR125,000 respectively, calculated as initial capital plus a quarter of the annual overhead cost.
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The MiFID licensing rules must be read in the context of crowdfunding. For instance, the knowledge and experience necessary for passing the fit-and-proper test relates to running an internet platform and investing in small-and medium-sized enterprises rather than the general distribution of financial products to the public. Further, crowdfunding platforms regulated under the MiFID light approach would need to keep adequate records, including the recording of telephone conversations or electronic communications relating to the reception, transmission and execution of client orders.
134 What constitutes adequate must be defined in light of MiFID's general mission to sustain proportionality. A platform with little traffic will be subject to different requirements than one platform with millions of daily users. relevant target market of each financial instrument. 146 These rules address conflicts of interest in the distribution chain of financial products created by commissions and other originator-oriented pay models.
In the context of crowdfunding platforms, these rules need rereading since crowdfunding platforms rely on funding rather than distribution. If read with the objective of crowdfunding in mind, they would lead to a partial but not excessive regulatory burden. For instance, consider the rules imposed on product originators and product distributors. Platforms offer crowdfunding projects. In turn, they must have in place adequate arrangements to obtain sufficient information on the product from the originator. In fact, crowdfunding platforms tend to engage in due diligence of the funded firms prior to making them available on their platforms. If they do, they will have the information required by Article 16 MiFID II.
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According to our crowdfunding understanding, the SME rather than the platform is creating the investment product (see the originator-related rules of Article 24 (2) MiFID II). In turn, rules relating to product origination 148 do not apply to the platform. 
CF modifications?
If our proposal is implemented and the platform's core activity is deemed to be a MiFID activity, a licensing requirement will apply. In some countries, the minimum cost of doing business will be greater than it is today due to the fixed cost of regulation for regulated entities. While we generally accept this, in return for a much bigger pan-European market we seek to mitigate the negative impact of regulation-induced fixed costs by proposing some modifications that reduce costs for small-scale platform start-ups.
In particular, our concept requires three modifications of the MiFID framework.
a) Disregard of 'financial instrument' restrictionNeutrality as to Legal Form
First, it shall apply to all crowdfunding platforms regardless of whether the product is a financial instrument. This is to ensure that (1) the European passport functions smoothly across Europe regardless of which legal form is widely used for crowdfunding in the particular European country (counter path dependency), and (2) the legal form of investment can meet the respective SME's most suitable legal form rather than a regulatory demand. For instance, the crowdfunding license should extend to instruments such as convertible bonds, limited partnership units, individual debt obligations and the provision of direct debt. Further, the crowdfunding license shall apply to both crowdlending and equity crowdfunding platforms that function as agents without taking any funding obligations onto their own balance sheets.
b) List of applicable rules
Second, while the above interpretation of MiFID II derives from an understanding of the legal text, additional certainty is achieved with an exclusive list of MiFID II and MiFIR provisions that do not apply to crowdfunding platforms whose activity is limited to order reception, transmission and execution. Such a list could be added to MiFID II implementing legislation. For instance, it could be expressly stated that the platform merely offers a crowdfunding opportunity, without recommending or manufacturing it.
However, we do not propose a lighter touch with regard to cost transparency and investor protection. In fact, the opaque cost structures of platforms that charge both the funded firm and funders for their services is a cause for concern. Our anecdotal evidence in this regard shows a wide array of fee models and fee sizes, ranging from one percent to fifteen percent if fees for funder, funded firms and service charges are taken together. 149 It is crucial that the same transparency standards developed over the years for regulated intermediaries similarly apply for crowdfunding platforms, where most funders are vulnerable to hidden fees, and most funded firms have little choice but to accept the terms set by the platform.
c) From 'too small to care' to 'too big to fail'
Third, a balanced risk analysis follows the evolution of any FinTech business from (1) too-small-to-care, to (2) too-large-toignore and then to (3) too-big-to-fail (TBTF). 150 The MIFIDlight framework focuses on investor protection at the too-largeto-ignore stage. This scenario requires two modifications to reflect the needs of the too-small-to-care and too-big-to-fail stages.
On the one hand, we propose a relevance threshold of EUR250,000, which refers to the total transaction volume processed by the platform. 151 While redress through private law will be available for fraud below this threshold, no regulation should apply. This minimum threshold would enable platform start-ups to pilot and test new business models with little risk, and hopefully prove to investors that their innovations work. In balancing the need for investor protection with the need to further innovation, we believe that the overall risk level to investors from very small platforms is acceptable. Further, the EUR250,000 transaction threshold ensures that a certain vagueness on definitions, for instance delineating donationbased platforms from lending and investment platforms, does not impair the functioning of the regulatory system. Finally, supervising very small platforms is expensive for regulators and is in many cases superfluous. Experience tells us that most startups fail. The same insight applies to platform start-ups. Many platforms will vanish before surpassing the EUR250,000 transaction threshold. Hence, there is no need to spend scarce resources on their supervision.
On the other hand once regulators come to the conclusion that a platform is of systemic importance, for example if the platform substitutes for systemically significant financial institutions (TBTF) or the platform is linked to an institutional client base (TCTF), we recommend measures to control and limit systemic risk. These include (a) structural requirements for the platform (quarantine provisions, IT capabilities, capital adequacy, minimum capital requirements for maintenance and remedial purposes, and segregation of EU/EEA activities from non-EU/EEA activities) and (b) empowering regulators to shut down the activity (while preserving customer data), or to appoint a commissioner to run the quarantined EU/EEA platform business in the public interest. 
Additional activities
Additional rules apply if platforms go further than simply order execution and transmission. Our base case scenario excludes platforms interested in channelling investors' money via the platform's own bank account to the SME or that function as depositories for investors' money, nor do we consider variants in which platforms provide advice to investors (albeit automatically) as to which investment they should choose. These activities are, for the most part, subject to the PSD II or a more extensive, or even full, MiFID II license. For instance, if a platform engages in providing investment advice with a search tool that relies on investors' risk sensitivity or other suitability criteria, the respective MiFID rules for investment advice will apply on top of the base case scenario rules laid out above.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have made three contributions to the discussion of how to regulate crowdfunding. First, we dismiss the idea that the risks of CF 153 are mitigated due to the relatively low size of contributions per investor. Regulation of a crowdfunding platform is necessary since the parties seeking capital are small start-ups with little choice as to funding and are less able to bear regulatory costs, while many funders are unsophisticated private investors in need of investor protection. 154 Further, both the established rationale of financial law (investor, financial system and stakeholder concerns) and the facilitation of the European single market warrant regulation. Second, we demonstrated that regulating the platform as the 'manager' of a crowdfunding scheme is the road the European Commission should take when implementing the CMU action plan. Third, we set out details of a MiFID II-oriented, light touch approach to crowdfunding regulation, based on the exemption provided by Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) CRR. The MiFID-light framework is an adequate base case scenario to address the too-large-to-ignore stage of platform business where the total transaction amount exceeds EUR250,000 p.a. In addition, systemic risk-oriented regulation for very large platforms should be embedded as a preventive measure.
Our three contributions would mitigate information asymmetry 155 and protect the market by building investor confidence. We would proceed not despite, but in recognition of, the economic potential of a well-functioning cross-border crowdfunding market in Europe. A light-touch regulation of crowdfunding provides the regulatory basis for a European crowdfunding passport, based on MiIFD, that mitigates against adverse effects from possible over-regulation after the financial crisis 156 and ensures some level of investor protection at the same time. This comes with the welcome side effects of (1) better information on the part of regulators and (2) the potential creation of a level playing field with other (regulated) forms of finance.
If our proposal is adopted, some crowdfunding platforms will not pass regulatory scrutiny or, given the fixed cost of regulation, unless their transaction volume surpasses the relevance threshold, will prove too small to remain in business. This is, however, a desired effect as regulation functions to single out less viable market participants, thereby ensuring that the public puts a higher level of trust in the remaining (licensed) entities.
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Our proposal would ensure that (1) very small platforms can test and enter into a pilot stage with some clients, (2) reliable platforms can grow across borders and achieve economies of scale previously unavailable to them, while their conduct is regulated according to a simple yet flexible set of rules that already exists and ensures sufficient transparency, and (3) that systemic risk is monitored. This should provide a bright outlook for professionally managed platforms, investors and SMEs alike.
